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This paper reviews issues in and procedures for the safety evaluation of in-vehicle Advanced
Driver Assistance Systems. Contrasts are drawn between the two main areas of driver
assistance systems — on the one hand information systems which interact with the driver
and on the other hand intervening systems which interact directly with the vehicle.
Navigation systems are typical of the former category and adaptive cruise control of the
latter. It is argued that, for information systems it is possible to develop a “generic” safety
assessment procedure, with a single generic test. A contrast is drawn with In the area of
intervening systems (driver warning and vehicle control systems), where no such generic
evaluation by means of a single test is possible. Such systems differ widely in their purpose,
in their intended operating environment, in their functionality and in their operating
envelope. The authors propose a structured procedural approach for the safety assessment
of intervening systems.
1. Introduction
Library shelves are bursting with a host of reports containing advice, guidelines, frameworks,
checklists and statements of principle on the safety assessment of in-vehicle technologies for
road vehicles. But there is still relatively little consensus on whether a single, generic
approach can be adopted for the safety assessment of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems.
Given this lack of consensus in the research and safety community, it is perhaps not
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surprising that the authorities have not established a standard procedure, at either a national
or an international level, for approving such systems before they come into production. This
paper presents a critical review of current recommendations for the safety assessment of
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems.
2. System categories
The term Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) can cover a full range of systems
varying from systems providing information, advice and warnings, through systems that
assist an/or intervene in vehicle control and manoeuvring tasks, all the way to systems that
support fully automatic driving (Zwaneveld et al., 1999; Becker et al., 2000). Four broad
types of ADAS may be distinguished. First of all there are systems intended to support
various aspects of the driving task by providing information, commonly termed In-Vehicle
Information Systems (IVIS). Typical examples are navigation systems and systems providing
information on traffic and road conditions, such as TrafficMaster and RDS-TMC receivers.
Secondly there are systems providing warnings or feedback, usually with the intention of
reducing driver errors or violations. The informative (advisory) version of Intelligent Speed
Adaptation, longitudinal collision warning systems, lane departure warning systems and
lane-change assistant systems are examples of this category. The warnings may be auditory,
visual or haptic (by force feedback or vibration). Thirdly, there are systems that intervene in
vehicle control but without completely supplanting the driver, and in some cases permitting
the driver to overrule system actions. Adaptive Cruise Control, Stop and Go and the various
intervening forms of Intelligent Speed Adaptation fall into this category. Finally, there is
automated driving, sometimes termed “autonomous driving”, in which the driver is
completely out of the loop and cannot overrule system actions. Installing these various
systems in vehicles changes the driver’s task, modifying certain components while others are
added or removed. With the more intervening systems, the role of the human driver will to a
greater or lesser extent be transformed from manual to supervisory control.
Vision enhancement systems are perhaps in a category of their own: while they may at first
appear to be purely informational, like IVIS, they are more like systems that intervene in
vehicle control in their impact on the driving task — the information flow is continuous and
the systems fundamentally affect the relationship between the driver and the road
environment. So perhaps vision enhancement systems should be included with the more
intervening types of ADAS. The greater salience of relevant objects when using a vision
enhancement system can perhaps be compared to receiving a warning.
3. Aspects of safety
The safety implications of Intelligent Transport Systems have been commonly classified into
three aspects (see e.g. Commission of the European Communities, 1991):
1. Functional System Safety, which covers safety problems from hardware design and from
software design. The particular focus is on technical reliability, the propensity for system
malfunction and the potential to go into a dangerous and/or unanticipated system mode.
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2. Human Machine Interaction (HMI), which focuses on interaction between the user and the
system. Key issues are the design and location of buttons, controls and screens (size,
brightness); menus; means of dialogue between the user and the system; the channel for
information exchange (auditory or visual) between the user and the system; and feedback
to the user (auditory, visual or haptic). Inappropriate design can lead to overload (too
much effort required) or underload (the user no longer involved in the main task of
driving) or to distraction from the driving task at inappropriate times.
3. Traffic Safety whose concern is safe operation of the traffic system. It covers the outcome
of both Functional System Safety and most but not all HMI problems (aspects of HMI
design that do not affect safety, such as modes of operation not available while driving,
are outside the traffic safety boundary). It also covers the ways in which the use of a
particular system might influence road user behaviour and alter the interaction between
the driver, the vehicle, the road infrastructure and other road users (including vulnerable
road users such as pedestrians and cyclists) in such a way that safety is affected.
The relationship between these three aspects of safety is illustrated in Figure 1.
Traffic 
Safety
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Functional
System Safety
Functional
Syste  Safety
Figure 1: The three aspects of safety
Different types of system will give rise to different concerns about safety, as summarised in
Table 1. Safety concerns with totally automated driving are primarily those of functional
system safety — is the software reliable, what happens if a sensor fails, will the system work
under various meteorological conditions, etc. With IVIS, the major safety concerns are about
HMI aspects, such as comprehension, distraction and workload. With systems that warn the
driver or intervene in vehicle control, the major concerns are about traffic safety — is the
driver out of the loop and therefore suffering from loss of situation awareness, do negative
behavioural adaptations arise. However, HMI aspects, such as the driver’s comprehension of
system functionality and system capabilities, may also be significant concerns with these two
system categories.
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Table 1: Safety concerns with different types of ADAS
Intervention level of
system
Intention of system
designers
Primary area(s) of
safety concern
Major issues
Information Provide information beyond
that available from the road
and traffic environment
HMI Distraction or overload lead
to driver errors
Warning and feedback Reduce errors and/or
violations
(HMI and) traffic
safety
As above + driver over-
reliance on the system
Intervention in vehicle
control
Increase comfort and/or
safety
(HMI and) traffic
safety
As above + misinterpretation
of system capabilities
Automated driving Increase road capacity,
improve safety and free the
driver for other tasks
Functional system
safety
System reliability and need
for driver intervention in case
of malfunction
4. System life cycle
In addition to system type and the three aspects of safety, there is a third dimension that has
to be considered in the safety assessment of driver assistance systems. This is the stage of
development of the system, or the system life cycle. A generic life cycle for intelligent
transport systems, showing the relationship between stage of development and safety aspects,
is presented in Figure 2 Numerous sets of guidelines have been produced over the years,
containing recommendations on safety issues and recommended procedures for the various
stages of system development (Noy, 1998; Carsten, 1999).
From Figure 2, it can be seen that, as an approximate rule of thumb, Functional System
Safety aspects are to be studied early in product development, the HMI should be validated
in mid-development and traffic safety validation can only be achieved in the real world by
means of field trials, in so-called “retrospective” traffic safety evaluation. There is no
predictive safety science which can reveal in advance how users will respond to a system,
and therefore no methodology other than empirical experience which can reveal whether a
particular system is safe in use. This is not to deny that there is knowledge of human
performance and models of human behaviour which can provide guidance in designing an
appropriate and thorough safety assessment. Without sensible hypotheses, to provide
guidance on issues of concern and scenarios to examine an evaluation is likely to be wasted.
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Figure 2: Life cycle for the safety of an ITS System (from UTMC22, 1999)
5. Towards a generic safety assessment of in-vehicle information systems
5.1 Alternative approaches
As indicated in Table 1, the primary area of safety concern with in-vehicle information
systems is with the effects of the HMI on user performance. There are three types of broad
approach which can be applied for the assessment of HMI (Parkes, 1995):
1. We can establish product or design standards. These take the form of specifying the
physical aspects of the system, for example a minimum screen size or a particular layout
of the control buttons. The standard computer or typewriter keyboard is a typical example.
Product standards are easy for the designer to follow, but they suffer from the drawback
that they are technology-dependent and therefore tend to stifle innovation. They also do
not guarantee the usability of the entire system or the safety of driving while using the
system.
2. We can develop and stipulate procedural standards. These take the form of prescribing a
programme of analysis and testing to be used in product development (ISO 9000/9001 is
the best-known example). Procedural standards generally require an inspection or
certification authority to enforce their use; they often require extensive documentation;
and they can be laborious to apply. In the case of in-vehicle HMI, they will not guarantee
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safe driving performance, but of course they can protect the system manufacturer who can
show that rules, regulations and advice were followed in the system design process.
3. We can impose performance standards. These specify a minimum level of performance
which must be met while the system is being used. In the case of IVIS, they might specify
a minimum level of performance for the primary task of driving or for the secondary task
of interacting with the in-vehicle system. Performance standards are technology
independent and do not limit innovation. If they require an assessment of performance in
the primary task of driving, they can provide an objective assessment of whether a
minimum level of safety is met. However, they require research effort for their
development and validation, and in actual use they may require testing by a particular test
house or with specific equipment.
In the automotive world, technical performance standards are quite common in the vehicle
design area, notably in such areas as braking and crashworthiness. Product standards are
surprisingly infrequent, so that not even pedal placement is specified by regulation.
5.2 Guidelines and checklists
In the area of HMI for in-vehicle information systems, the primary focus has been on the
development of procedural guidelines and pre-standards. Ian Noy (1998) has proposed that
such procedures could form the basis of a “process-oriented standard” for safety assurance,
modelled on the ISO 9000 series, which could be adopted by industry voluntarily or even be
imposed by governments as a requirement. The original such guidance was the
PROMETHEUS MMI Checklist (Nilsson and Alm, 1991) which was produced in 1991 and
was followed by the DRIVE II HARDIE Design Guidelines (Ross et al., 1995) and
Handbook (Ross et al., 1996). Further elaboration and refinement has led to the UK Safety
Checklist for the Assessment of In-Vehicle Systems (Stevens et al., 1999) with a 12-page
form, 5 pages of instructions and 26 pages of supporting information. However, for
answering a particular question such as “Is the IVIS free from reflections and glare under all
ambient light conditions?”, an extensive set of reviews and tests may be required.
There is little doubt that following the procedures recommended in such checklists can help
to produce a better-designed system and to identify design errors and problems and thus
contribute to safer systems. But the sheer laboriousness of the procedures recommended is
likely to mean that shortcuts will be taken. Perhaps more serious, the procedures are in the
main subjective and cannot provide a certainty that a minimum level of safe performance in
driving has been met. A current Swedish research initiative, the SafeTE (Safe Test and
Evaluation) project, is aiming at extending recent checklists with a behavioural evaluation
and also at including explicit safety estimates as a pre-stage to pass-fail criteria.
In terms of the laboriousness of such checklists, there has been considerable effort at both
national and European levels to reduce them to a set of major principles. The outcomes are
the UK Code of Practice (Department of Transport, 1994), the German Code of Practice
(Wirtschaftsforum Verkehrstelematik, 1996), the ECMT Statement of Principles of Good
Practice (ECMT, 1995) and, most recently, the European Statement of Principles on Human
Machine Interface from the HMI Expert Task Force (European Commission, 2000). But such
codes suffer from the fact that, while they enshrine very worthy principles of good design,
they do not provide a regime for assessing a design.
O.M.J. Carsten and L. Nilsson 231
Indeed this lack of a regime is acknowledged explicitly in the European Statement of
Principles and the associated document, the Expansion of the Principles (European
Commission DGXIII, 1998). For example, the section of the document on overall design
principles states: “The system should be designed in such a way so that the allocation of
driver attention to the system displays or controls remain compatible with the attentional
demands of the driving situation.” This is a worthy and incontrovertible statement and it is
hard to quarrel with the rationale that is given in the Expansion of the Principles: “To ensure
that the driver’s ability to be in full control of the vehicle is not compromised by the use of a
driver information or communications system”. The expansion of the principle continues
with a set of definitions. Thus attentional demand is defined as “the physical and mental
‘resource’ required at any instant to successfully perform a particular task”. In relation to this
definition, it is pointed out that the attentional demand of driving varies with the driving
situation and that attentional demand from interacting with system displays and controls will
also vary. However, when it comes to the point at which a set of procedures might be
expected on how to evaluate compliance with the principle, the document dodges the issue
and states: “No specific assessment of a system according to this Principle is envisaged.”
The guidance provided by the Statement of Principles on information presentation is as
follows:
 Visually displayed information should be such that the driver can assimilate it with a few
glances which are brief enough not to adversely affect driving.
 Where available internationally and/or nationally agreed standards related to legibility,
audibility, icons, symbols, words, acronyms or abbreviations should be used.
 Information relevant to the driving task should be timely and accurate.
 The system should not present information which may result in potentially hazardous
behaviour by the driver or other road users.
 The system should not produce uncontrollable sound levels liable to mask warnings from
within the vehicle or outside.
Here again, the Expansion of the Principles offers no advice on how compliance with this
guidance should be assessed and once again states in relation to the statement about
information which could produced hazardous behaviour: “No specific assessment of a
system according to this Principle is envisaged by the Task Force.”
We are thus left with a somewhat unsatisfactory situation. Both the research community and
the authorities have recognised the dangers inherent in HMI designs that can overload or
distract the driver. Some quite elaborate checklists with detailed advice on assessment
procedures have been developed, but these have no pass-fail criteria and there is no legal
requirement for compliance. On the other hand, the European Commission has
recommended to the motor manufacturing and supply industries that they should comply
with the Statement of Principles, and has invited member states to encourage industry to
adhere to the principles. The Commission has further indicated that the member states are to
provide the Commission by December 2001 with a report on adherence to the principles.
This would be all very well apart from the facts that the principles are so vague as to be
meaningless and that there is no means of establishing compliance with any of them, since
advice on specific assessment is excluded.
Of course checklists can be used in a different way — as initial screening tools to develop
hypotheses about a system rather than as evaluation tools in themselves. A checklist for use
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as a screening tool for the evaluation of in-vehicle information systems has been developed
in a Dutch national project (Brookhuis, Van Winsum, Heijer and Dynstee, 1999). A similar
approach was adopted in a cross-modal European research project on the human implications
of new technology (Carsten, 1998).
5.3 Performance tests
As an alternative to such advice and guidance, there have been a number of attempts at
creating performance tests that focus on users’ interaction with an In-Vehicle Information
System. One approach has concentrated on the cognitive load imposed by the task; another
approach has focused on the visual distraction. For both approaches, the claim is made that
the test procedure can be applied in a laboratory environment without the involvement of any
driving task, in other words the procedure only examines the secondary task and the driving
context is removed from the assessment.
Tests for evaluating cognitive load work by simulating and evaluating the user task and
producing a qualitative rating or quantitative score of task complexity and difficulty. One
example is DIADEM (Dialogue Design and Evaluation Method), which is a commercial
product that was applied for road-vehicle HMI evaluation in the DRIVE II EMMIS project
(Nirschl, Blum and Eck, 1995; Nirschl and Eck, 1993). In DIADEM, the user tasks in
dialogue with the system are represented as a series of formal steps (if x, then y). Tasks that
require reference to user knowledge are distinguished from those that merely require simple
response to system prompts. In addition, situation-dependent actions are distinguished in
order to identify the need for reference to the state of the vehicle or the environment. Once
all the action steps required have been specified, a production rule set is generated. From this
rule set, complexity measures (e.g. learning effort, execution time, visual distraction) are
derived in order to evaluate the system. DIADEM and similar methods have been subjected
to two major criticisms. Firstly, tasks that are conceptually more complex in terms of
production systems theory, may not be more difficult to perform in actuality (a good example
is catching a ball). Secondly, the evaluation is to be carried out as a primary task, i.e. it is
divorced from the actual driving context. This criticism has also been made about the
application of DIADEM in the aviation domain where it has been stated that the method
“[does] not take account of the timing and multi-user aspects, and has little regard for the
context” (Valot et al., 1997, p. 123).
The “15-second rule”, which is a recommendation of the SAE (Society of Automotive
Engineers) Safety and Human Factors Committee stipulates a minimum level of performance
in using an in-vehicle navigation system (Green, 1999a; Green, 1999b; Farber, 2000). The
rule is intended to outlaw systems that require the driver to take his or her eyes off the road
for too long, but, in order to simplify the measurement task, it actually measures total task
time rather than glance frequency or glance duration. The proposed standard stipulates that
the total task time, for any task permitted by a navigation system while the vehicle is in
motion, should be no longer than 15 seconds. However the actual measurement is not done
with an actual system while driving. Rather, it is done in the laboratory as a static task using
a prototype or mock-up of a system
A number of issues arise when considering the 15-second rule. One question is whether
static and dynamic task times are correlated — there is no inherent reason to believe that the
rankings of tasks when performed statically will be the same as the ranking of those same
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tasks when performed dynamically. Another problem concerns whether dynamic task time is
correlated with “eyes off the road time”. For example, some tasks requiring manual input can
be performed with only minimal visual confirmation or even without the driver taking his or
her eyes off the road, while others may require substantial glance time. Therefore task time
and “eyes off the road time” may not correspond: one could get a task with long duration that
is performed safely because the driver is able to keep his/her eyes on the road.
In addition, the validity of the total task time concept has been disputed. It has been found
that drivers tend to “chunk” large tasks into smaller sub-tasks of between 1 and 2 seconds
glance duration (Zwahlen et al., 1988; Wierwille et al., 1988; Dingus et al., 1989). Using
total time on task as a surrogate measure for safety implies that ten glances, each of 1.5
seconds duration are less safe than a single 14-second glance. Finally, the method ignores
cognitive load. There is evidence that cognitive load can lead to distraction and reduced
Situation Awareness. Car phone studies have shown, for example, that the driving task is not
only affected by the use of a phone while driving, but also by the content of the phone
conversation that is conducted (Parkes, 1991; Lamble et al., 1999).
It can be argued, therefore, that cut-down performance tests are implausible tools on
theoretical grounds and, moreover, have not been properly validated. Perhaps their greatest
deficiency is the removal of the context of the driving task. But there are substantial
attractions to the performance approach. A performance test uses objective and verifiable
criteria as opposed to the subjective judgements that have to be used when using a procedural
approach. Unlike design standards, performance standards do not create any roadblocks to
innovation by freezing current practices. Indeed they free the product developer to use any
design whatever, provided that, in the end, the outcome can be shown to meet a minimum
level of performance.
There is considerable force of logic to using performance in the primary task of driving as
the gold standard, rather than using performance in the secondary task of interacting with an
IVIS. The primary task approach is more realistic in that it does not remove context but
requires consideration of context, has greater face validity and creates indicators that are
more obviously related to safety than task time or task complexity. There has been
considerable acknowledgement of the need to focus on driving performance as the yardstick .
For example, a U.S. Human Factors workshop in 1997 identified research on the role of task
load in perception and decision-making and the influence of such task load on driver
behaviour as the number one human factors research need in the area of Intelligent Transport
Systems (Battelle Research Group, 1998).
5.4 The HASTE initiative
The new European HASTE (Human Machine Interface And the Safety of Traffic in Europe)
project, funded in the Fifth Framework Growth Programme, is focussed on addressing this
need to look at the influence of task load on driver behaviour. The aim of HASTE is to
develop a procedure to quantify safety problems with IVIS with a view that this procedure
can eventually become the basis for an objective performance standard.
The objectives of HASTE are to:
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 Identify traffic scenarios in which safety problems with an IVIS are more likely to occur;
 Explore the relationships between task load and risk in the context of those scenarios;
 Understand the mechanisms through which elevated risk may occur in terms of distraction
and reduced Situation Awareness; and
 Identify the best indicators of risk in terms of accident surrogates.
The overall approach of the project is illustrated in Figure 3. Visual demand and cognitive
load will be studied both separately and in conjunction. Initially, they will be manipulated
though artificial tasks which impose either visual distraction or mental load. The effects of
these tasks in the context of various driving situations will be monitored and drivers’
situation awareness and driving performance measured.
Visual
Demand
Glance
Behaviour
Driving
Performance
(control)
Situation
Awareness
Safety
Cognitive
Load Workload
Driving
Performance
(control)
Situation
Awareness
Safety
SCENARIO
Figure 3: The HASTE approach
The hypothesis is that, with increased visual and/or cognitive load, risk will increase
exponentially, as it does for many other safety problems including speeding and alcohol
impairment. If confirmed, the exponential relationship will permit the selection of “critical”
level of risk to be made on statistical grounds. The exponential relationship is shown in
Figure 4, which also illustrates that much of the experimental studies in HASTE will be, for
obvious practical and ethical reasons, carried on various driving simulators. At lower levels
of demand, complementary studies will be carried out in real traffic with instrumented cars.
This will allow some validation of the simulator-based studies.
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Figure 4: Hypothesised increase in risk with task load
In a subsequent phase of the project, the traffic scenarios and safety indicators will be applied
to the evaluation of real in-vehicle information systems. The major output will be a pre-
deployment test regime for general use which can eventually serve as the basis for a formal
approval process. This generic regime, which could be applied to determining whether any
IVIS is safe for actual use, will obviously have to be practicable and cost-effective as well as
properly validated. Specific groups of users, such as novice and elderly drivers will have to
be considered carefully in designing the regime.
6. Can the same generic approach be applied to warning and intervening
systems?
As discussed in Section 2, Driver Assistance Systems extend beyond purely informational
systems to ones that warn the driver or intervene in vehicle control. Such warning and
intervening systems will have very different effects on driving from IVIS. Whereas the safety
concerns with IVIS are about overload and distraction, with these systems the concerns are
about underload, overreliance on the system, misunderstanding of system functioning,
system mode confusion and behavioural adaptation.
6.1 Underload
Systems that automate parts of the driving task, such as ACC and other forms of semi-
automatic longitudinal control, may reduce driver workload and lead to reliance on the
system, i.e. “automation induced complacency”. It has been suggested (Parasuraman, Molloy
and Singh, 1993) that automation of part of the driving task may lead to driver underload and
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hence loss of situation awareness. Situation awareness can be regarded as consisting of three
levels — perception of elements in the current situation, comprehension of the current
situation and projection of future status (Endsley, 1995).
Perhaps the most dangerous situation is low demand driving followed by a critical high-
demand or high-workload event, which could occur if a driver assistance system is not able
to cope with a situation and therefore driver intervention is required. Bainbridge (1987) has
pointed to such automation-induced complacency as one of the “ironies of automation.”
Experimental work has confirmed that low workload can potentially lead to loss of situation
awareness and a resulting inability to respond in time to critical events. In an experiment
investigating ACC carried out on the VTI driving simulator, drivers approached a stationary
queue on a motorway (Nilsson, 1995). The ACC was set not to detect stationary objects so
that the drivers had to detect the queue and slow down the vehicle appropriately. The design
was a between-subjects design with ten drivers assigned to the ACC group and ten to the
non-ACC group. In the ACC condition five drivers crashed into the queue; in the non-ACC
condition one driver crashed. The author suggests this was due to drivers misunderstanding
the system and expecting it to respond in such situations, especially as the ACC had
previously been able to cope with analogous situations without a need for manual
intervention. The drivers realised too late that the ACC would not handle the situation and
that they had to intervene.
A similar experiment was conducted on the HUSAT simulator at Loughborough University.
Drivers were exposed to a stationary queue at the end of a one-hour driving session on a two-
lane highway. Fifty-six drivers participated with half assigned to the ACC condition and half
driving in the non-ACC condition. The result of the experiment was that minimum time-to-
collision into the stationary queue was significantly shorter with ACC (Richardson, Ward,
Fairclough and Graham, 1996).
It appears that problems occur when drivers are required to regain control of a previously
automated system. Stanton et al. (1997) reported such effects for an ACC system and
Desmond et al. (1998) for an automated lane guidance system. The authors comment that the
results strongly support human-centred strategies, whereby the driver is involved in the
driving task, and indicate that such strategies are superior to total automation.
With the introduction of ADAS, the role of the human driver will be transformed from
manual to supervisory control, i.e. observing the interaction of the system with the
environment. Such supervisory control can be seen as a more difficult human task than
manual control, since the demand on human cognition is increased, while the demand on
human action is decreased (Wickens, 1992). We therefore get the worst combination: low
arousal and high momentary stress when things go wrong.
6.2 Misunderstanding of system functioning
A type of error that can occur with intervening systems is that drivers may misunderstand the
performance envelope of the system. Drivers will not necessarily understand the limitations
of the technologies underlying an in-vehicle system or the constraints imposed by the
designers on system operation. This could arise with an Adaptive Cruise Control. After
experiencing the fact that the system is capable of considerable deceleration (some ACCs
have braking capability that encompasses 80 or 90 percent of the distribution of driver
braking severity), drivers may interpret an ACC as a collision avoidance system. As a result,
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drivers may tend to be slow in resuming manual control when a critical situation does
develop, anticipating that the ACC will be able to cope. This is what Fancher and Ervin
(1998) have termed the “authority” issue — how much authority does the ACC have over the
operation of the vehicle.
With driver assistance systems that intervene in or take over part of vehicle control, one part
of the driving task is now monitoring the operation of the system rather than interacting
directly with the vehicle. This interaction will take place both directly through whatever
interface is provided by the car manufacturer, and indirectly through sensing system
operation. One crucial aspect of such monitoring is the detection of faults and failures in the
system. Bainbridge (1987) has pointed out the poor performance of humans in monitoring
tasks.
Equally, mode errors of the type that have been reported in aviation human factors with
complex automated flight systems may arise: the driver may not be aware of whether the
system is enabled or disabled, or in which mode it is currently operating. This could mean
that the driver’s intuitive prediction of how the system will function may be inaccurate. With
ACC, the driver may not be aware of whether the ACC is enabled or disabled, is in “pure”
cruise control mode or in headway mode. After leaving a motorway the driver may forget
that the ACC is still on. As systems become more complex and start to combine various
functions, such errors may become more likely.
6.3 Behavioural adaptation
The new vehicle control systems have direct effects on driver behaviour through system
parameters. Thus with Adaptive Cruise Control the minimum time headway permitted by the
vehicle manufacturer will prevent the driver from adopting a smaller headway without
switching the system off or into standby. Similarly with Intelligent Speed Adaptation,
maximum vehicle speed will, with a mandatory version, be set by the system. But there is
overwhelming evidence that, beyond these direct engineering effects of the systems, drivers
engage in further, indirect modifications of their behaviours when using these new devices.
These indirect changes in behaviour are often termed “behavioural adaptations.”
The standard definition of behavioural adaptation from the OECD report of 1990 is:
“Behavioural adaptations are those behaviours which may occur following the introduction
of changes to the road-vehicle-user system and which are not intended by the initiators of the
change.” The report continues: “For behavioural adaptation to occur, it must be assumed that
there is feedback to road users, that they can perceive the feedback (but not necessarily
consciously) that road users have the ability to change their behaviour, and that they have the
motivation to change their behaviour” (OECD, 1990).
There is already a considerable literature on behavioural adaptation to ADAS. Some
examples of adaptations to ACC can be used as illustrations of the phenomenon. An
experiment was conducted on the University of Groningen driving simulator with 38 subjects
(Hoedemaeker, 1999). The subjects first drove a motorway route without ACC and
subsequently drove the same route three more times, each time with a different version of
ACC out of a total of six alternative versions. The ACCs varied in terms of the set time
headway and in terms of whether the system could be overruled in headway mode by use of
the accelerator or brake. All the ACCs had sufficient “authority” to bring the vehicle to a safe
stop. With ACC, speeds increased in both light and heavy traffic situations. Standard
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deviation of lateral position increased with ACC, particularly in heavy traffic, which is not
likely to be beneficial to safety. Use of the left (fast) lane also increased with ACC,
presumably because of the higher speed choice.
In the same experiment, differences were found by driving style. Fast drivers identified by
the Driving Style Questionnaire of West, Elander and French (1992) increased their standard
deviation of lateral position with ACC while driving in light traffic, whereas slow drivers
decreased their standard deviation of lateral position in the same situation.
Driving style was also investigated in the Michigan Field Operational Test (Fancher et al.,
1998). Here driving style was classified on the basis of actual speed and headway choice.
From most aggressive to least aggressive, the categories were hunter/tailgaters, extremists,
planners, flow conformists and ultraconservatives. It was found that the first group used the
ACC relatively less often, in all probability because the system’s minimum time headway of
1.1 seconds was larger than the drivers’ preferred time headway of 0.6 to 0.8 seconds.
What these examples make clear is that such adaptations can be anticipated but they cannot
be predicted, certainly not in their precise form. In a recent comment on the unpredictability
of economic forces, Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, declared:
“[Do we] have the capability to eliminate booms and busts? The answer, in my judgment, is
no, because there is no tool to change human nature or to predict human behaviour with great
confidence.” (Financial Times, 26 May 2001) This same message applied in the area of
Driver Assistance Systems. We know that humans will find ways to maximise their personal
benefits from the systems, and once we observe those adaptations we can generally
understand them. But without observing them, we cannot predict them. Thus empirical
studies, informed by reasonable hypotheses, are a necessity if we are to learn how these
systems will actually be used.
6.4 The necessity of a process-oriented approach
The need for empirical studies drives us back to the process-oriented approach advocated by
Noy (1998). But whereas Noy’s main concern was with IVIS, the process-oriented approach
seems more appropriate for warning systems and the various Driver Assistance Systems that
intervene in vehicle control. Such an approach has recently been advocated by the European
RESPONSE project (Cieler et al., 2000). The RESPONSE approach is a three-step
procedure. The first step is full functional system safety evaluation. The second major step is
one or more controlled, short-term and accompanied drives, which should involve specific
risk groups such as inexperienced, elderly, cognitively-impaired and risk-prone drivers. At
this stage, specific potential problem scenarios, identified by earlier “risk identification” are
investigated. And the third step is an unaccompanied long-term experiment, i.e. a field trial
in which the system is used for several weeks.
This approach is eminently sensible (and, it could be argued, not that different from the
advice produced in earlier projects or the process depicted in Figure 2). What is needed in
addition is a formal quality assurance procedure as advocated by Noy (1998), involving
detailed record keeping, to cover all decisions and information used in the design and
product development process, as well as an audit process that allows both internal and
external audits. In the long run, we should perhaps move to a formal certification process for
the approval of new ADAS.
O.M.J. Carsten and L. Nilsson 239
One initiative in this direction is another European project, ADVISORS. The project aims
include: definition of implementation scenarios and key actors; analysis of foreseen technical
and behavioural risks of various ADAS; identification of barriers to ADAS implementation
and the importance of human factors for their successful deployment; definition of measures
and strategies to overcome identified barriers; and development of a common impact
assessment methodology.
In spite of such efforts there are still some crucial unresolved issues. One problem area is the
formulation of the behavioural and safety hypotheses about a system as part of the risk
identification procedures. Without appropriate hypotheses, subsequent evaluation may well
be at best ill-informed and at worse pointless. This topic is addressed by the CODE Road
Safety Guidelines (Draskóczy et al., 1998) which provides a structure for the generation of
hypotheses in the form of a kind of checklist and which gives examples of the kinds of
hypotheses that can be generated about a variety of ITS applications. But the problem is not
just one of advice on how to generate sensible hypotheses. It is also one of transparency in
the process of doing so. Ideally, there should be consultation with outside experts and a
documented audit trail of that discussion. That documentation could then be used in any
subsequent product approval or even in product liability lawsuits.
Another problem area is that of translating observed results, gathered in simulator studies,
controlled drives, and uncontrolled field trials into predictions about safety changes. It is
notoriously difficult to take data about changes in driving performance or behaviour and
translate those findings into predicted changes in accident numbers. It is even more difficult
to consider scenarios in which vehicles are on the road with a variety of ADAS, including in
some cases multiple ADAS. Here microsimulation modelling offers the promise of a solution
(Carsten, 2001). Microsimulation models could be “educated” with information generated
from off- and on-road trials on both driver errors (from, for example, reduced Situation
Awareness) and behavioural adaptation to new systems. The same models could produce
safety predictions, in the form of near misses, which would be analogous to the traffic
conflicts sometimes used in the safety evaluations of more traditional schemes. But we are a
long way from having such models, and a considerable effort will be required to generate
them, although some first, tentative steps have begun. One example is the SINDI project
(Safety Indicators – a basis for assessment of safety effects of Intelligent Transport Systems)
(Lind et al., 2000). Here the intention is to collect and use behavioural knowledge (data) as
input to the micro-simulation model, while an expert system will be used to interpret the
output from the micro-simulation (safety indicators) in terms of probable effects on traffic
safety.
7. Conclusions
There is no inherent reason why the same safety assessment approach should be applied
across all Driver Assistance Systems. For pure information systems, of which navigation
systems are the most obvious example, there is a reasonable prospect of generating a
standardised performance assessment which can both free designers to innovate and permit
the authorities to assure themselves that safety is not harmed. But for systems that provide
warnings or intervene in vehicle control, a generic test is not feasible. Here the structured
process-oriented approach is appropriate. But this approach needs to be further specified and
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enhanced, for example through defining common test scenarios and indicators for various
sub-categories of warning and intervening systems. The rationale for utilising common
scenarios and indicators across assessment activities is that it would provide the possibility
of comparing the results and so enhance the power of the experimental work.
A safety assessment will only be as good as the hypotheses that initially inform it. And we
are still not able to translate complex and often contradictory results expressed in terms of a
variety of safety indicators (variation in lane position, reaction time, car following behaviour)
into reliable estimates of changes in safety in a road network. Here there is large potential for
using microsimulation models, but their development will be no small task.
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